Single-Component Privacy Guarantees in Helper Data Systems and Sparse
  Coding with Ambiguation by Razeghi, Behrooz et al.
Single-Component Privacy Guarantees in
Helper Data Systems and
Sparse Coding with Ambiguation
Behrooz Razeghi∗, Taras Stanko†, Boris Škoric´†, Slava Voloshynovskiy∗
∗Department of Computer Science, University of Geneva, Switzerland
{behrooz.razeghi, svolos}@unige.ch
†Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands
{t.stanko, b.skoric}@tue.nl
Abstract—We investigate the privacy of two approaches to
(biometric) template protection: Helper Data Systems and Sparse
Ternary Coding with Ambiguation. In particular, we focus
on a privacy property that is often overlooked, namely how
much leakage exists about one specific binary property of one
component of the feature vector. This property is e.g. the sign or
an indicator that a threshold is exceeded.
We provide evidence that both approaches are able to protect
such sensitive binary variables, and discuss how system param-
eters need to be set.
Index Terms—privacy, biometric authentication, template pro-
tection
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Privacy-preserving storage of biometric enrollment data
Biometric data such as fingerprints and irises cannot be treated
as a secret. After all, we leave latent fingerprints on many
objects that we touch, and high-resolution photos of faces
reveal a lot about our irises. Nonetheless, person authentication
based on biometrics is still possible, provided that the verifier
performs good liveness detection. In spite of the not-really-
secret nature of biometric data there are very good reasons
to treat them as confidential. Storing biometric databases in
unprotected form would lead to various privacy issues. In
this paper we focus on one particular privacy problem: some
biometric data reveal medical conditions.
The protection of this kind of data must be as good as the
protection of passwords. The attacker model in the case of
password storage states that the adversary is an insider, i.e.,
somebody who has access to cryptographic keys. Furthermore,
the standard use case considered in most of the literature
dictates that the biometric prover does not have to type
long keys or to present a smartcard. This combination of
attacker model and use case implies that simply encrypting
the confidential data is not an option. The typical solution for
passwords is to apply a one-way function and to store the hash
of each password. However, this solution does not work for
noisy data such as biometrics; one bit flip in the input of the
hash function causes 50% bit flips in the output.
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Several techniques have been developed for securely storing
noisy credentials, also known as template protection, in the
above given context: (i) Helper Data Systems (HDS), also
known as fuzzy commitment, secure sketch, fuzzy extractor
[1]–[4]; (ii) Locality Sensitive Hash (LSH) functions [5], [6];
(iii) homomorphic encryption [7], [8]; and most recently (iv)
Sparse Coding with Ambiguation (SCA) [9]–[12].
B. Comparison of Template Protection Techniques
The LSH approach is fast but does not give clear privacy
guarantees. Homomorphic encryption has excellent privacy,
but is computationally expensive. In this paper we will not
consider the LSH and homomorphic crypto approach.
The HDS approach is the oldest and is well studied. Never-
theless, the narrow privacy question of protecting one specific
aspect of the biometric, which is relevant for the above
mentioned medical condition, has not been studied in detail.
The aim of this paper is to compare the privacy properties of
the HDS and the SCA approach, in particular the ‘medical
condition’ aspect. Here it is important to note that previous
work on SCA has focused only on the inability of an adversary
to reconstruct the full biometric from the enrollment data; that
is not the property we will be looking at in the current paper.
Mostly, in the literature, the protection of a vector x ∈ RN
is considered. However, often it is the projection of x onto
some fixed direction v that is relevant, z = x · v. The range
in which z lies can be privacy-sensitive, e.g. the sign of z or
whether z is far away from average.
C. Contributions
We concentrate on one component xn of a to-be-protected
random vector x, in particular a binary property ψ(xn), which
is either the sign or an ‘extremeness’ indicator that checks
if |xn| exceeds some threshold. We investigate how much
information leaks about ψ(xn) through the enrollment data.
• In quantizing HDSs high leakage can occur if a bad pa-
rameter choice is made. The best choice is to take an even
number of quantization intervals, and to subdivide them into
two helper data intervals; then there is zero leakage about
the sign and the ‘extremeness’.
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Fig. 1: Data flow in: (a) generic Helper Data System and (b)
general Sparse Coding with Ambiguation mechanism.
• The Code Offset Method causes negligible leakage.
• In the SCA mechanism, leakage about the ‘extremeness’ bit
can be made negligibly small by setting the ambiguation
noise level larger than the Hamming weight of the sparse
ternary representation. This noise has little impact on the
performance of the authentication system, since it gets re-
moved in case of a genuine user’s verification measurement.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation and Terminology
Vectors and matrices are denoted by boldface lower-case (v)
and upper-case (M). When there is no distinction between
a scalar (w), vector (w), or matrix (W), we write w. The
notation m(j) denotes the j-th column of M. An enrollment
measurement will be written as a vector x, and the verification
measurement as y. When a distinction needs to be made
between a random variable (RV) and its numerical value,
the RV is written in capitals, and the value in lowercase.
Expectation over x is denoted as Ex. The Shannon entropy
of a discrete RV X is denoted as H(X) and is defined
as H(X) =
∑
x px log
1
px
. The conditional entropy of X
given Y is written as H(X|Y ) and is defined as H(X|Y ) =
EyH(X|Y =y). The mutual information between X and Y is
I(X;Y )=H(X)−H(X|Y ). For p ∈ [0, 1] the binary entropy
function h is defined as h(p) = p log 1p + (1− p) log 11−p . We
use the notation [n] = {1, ..., n}. The superscript (·)T stands
for the transpose and (·)† for pseudo-inverse. The logarithm
‘log’ has base 2. Bitwise XOR is denoted as ⊕. The Heaviside
step function is written as Θ(·).
We will work with the following authentication setting. The
Verifier owns an enrolment database of public data P (c) for a
set of users c ∈ [C]. In the verification phase he is presented
with a vector y and a user label c; his task is to decide if y
is consistent with P (c).
B. Zero Leakage Helper Data Systems
A HDS in its most general form is shown in Fig. 1a. The
Gen procedure takes as input a measurement x. Gen outputs
a secret s and public Helper Data u, where x, s and u can
be scalar, vector, or matrix, in general. The helper data is
stored in a memory that can be accessed by the adversary.
In the reproduction phase, a fresh measurement y is obtained.
Typically y is close to x but not identical. The Rec procedure
takes y and u as input. It outputs sˆ, an estimate of s. If y
is sufficiently close to x, then sˆ = s. The ‘Zero Leakage’
(ZL) property is defined as I(U ;S) = 0, i.e., the helper data
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Figure 1: According to Theorem ??: upper bound on Paccept as a function of nav, for di↵erent K,
in case of the Poisson distribution.
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Fig. 2: Example of the Zero Leakage discretising HDS with
four quantisation intervals s ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The discrete helper
data u ∈ {0, 1, 2} is indicate as gray cales.
reveals nothing about the secret. Obviously, U has to leak
about X , since U is a function of X . When s = x the HDS is
referred to as a Secure Sketch. When S given U has a uniform
distribution, the HDS is called a Fuzzy Extractor. If X is a
continuum variable, the first step in the signal processing is
discretisation. For this purpose, a special ZLHDS has been
designed [13]–[15] which reduces quantisation errors. The
distribution of X needs to be known. After discretisation the
Code Offset Method can be applied (Section II-C).
The discretising ZLHDS is shown in Fig. 2. Consider a source
X ∈ R, with X ∼ f(x). Let F be the cumulative distri-
bution. The x-axis is divided into J quantisation intervals
corresponding to the extracted secret s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J − 1}.
The distribution of S is not necessarily uniform. Let qs be the
left boundary of the interval S = s. Let {ps}J−1s=0 denote the
probabilities of the s-values. Then F (qs) =
∑s−1
i=0 pi. Each s-
interval is equiprobably divided into m sub-intervals (depicted
as grayscales in Fig. 2); the helper data u is defined as the
index of the sub-interval in which the enrollment x lies. The
s and u are computed from x as follows:
s = max{t|qt ≤ x} ; u =
⌊
m
F (x)− F (qs)
ps
⌋
. (1)
In the limit m→∞, the helper data can be seen as a quantile
u˜ = um ∈ [0, 1) within the s-interval. It holds that F (x) =
F (qs) + u˜ps.
C. The Code Offset Method [1], [16]
Consider ψ(x), ψ(y) ∈ {0, 1}N . Consider a linear bi-
nary error-correcting code with syndrome function Syn :
{0, 1}N → {0, 1}N−k and syndrome decoding function
SynDec : {0, 1}N−k → {0, 1}N , where k is the message
length. The Code Offset Method in its simplest form can be
used as a Secure Sketch for any distribution of X . The helper
data and the reconstruction ψ̂(x) are defined as follows:
u = Synψ(x); ψ̂(x) = ψ(y)⊕ SynDec(u⊕ Synψ(y)). (2)
D. Sparse Ternary Coding (STC) [10], [17]
The encoder is a mapping ϕ : RN → {−1, 0,+1}L, where
L may be smaller, equal to, or larger than N . The ϕ(x) is
a sparse encoding of x; the number of nonzero entries is
St  L, which is called the sparsity level. The encoder first
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Fig. 3: (a) Ternary thresholding; (b) Binary thresholding; (c)
Binarisation.
applies a projection matrix W ∈ RL×N and then element-
wise thresholding ψstcλ , where λ is a parameter, ψ
stc
λ (q) ,
sign(q)Θ(|q| − λ) (see Fig. 3a).
v= ϕ (x) = ψstcλ (Wx)∈{−1, 0,+1}L. (3)
The threshold λ is tuned to get the desired sparsity level St.
The decoder produces an estimator for x as x̂ = W†v.
E. Sparse Binary Coding (SBC)
Here the thresholding function is ψsbcτ (x) , Θ(|x| − τ)
(Fig. 3b). Given a (raw) feature vector x ∈ RN SBC generates
a binary vector ψsbcτ (x) ∈ {0, 1}N .
F. Binary Coding (BC)
This is the component-wise sign operation (Fig. 3c) excluding
zeros. Given a (raw) feature vector x ∈ RN the BC simply
generates a binary vector ψbc (x) = sign (x) ∈ {−1, 1}N .
G. Sparse Coding with Amibiguation (SCA) [9], [10]
Given a sparse ternary vector v = ϕ(x) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}L, the
ambiguation mechanism A turns Sn randomly chosen zero
components of v into a (random) ±1. The resulting ternary
vector u = A(v) is stored as enrolment data (see Fig. 4),
together with the matrix W. The randomly added nonzero
components make it prohibitively difficult to reconstruct x
from u, while still allowing a verifier to check if a verification
measurement y is consistent with u.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We formally capture the ‘medical condition’ issue as follows.
We model the existence of the privacy-sensitive medical con-
dition as a binary function of one of the components of the
enrollment measurement x ∈ RN . That is, we say that ψ(xn)
is the quantity that should not leak, for some n ∈ [N ].
We will work with two choices for the function ψ(·) that seem
to make sense in our context: (a) ψ(·) = ψsbcτ (·) (see Fig. 3b),
and (b) ψ(·) = ψbc(·) (see Fig. 3c). We will assume that the
index n is not known to the legitimate parties at the time of
enrollment. Otherwise, there is a trivial solution.
We will consider only distributions of X that are symmetric
around X = 0, i.e., even functions f(x). Furthermore we work
in the ‘perfect enrollment’ model, which states that there is
no measurement noise at enrollment time. In this way we are
erring on the side of caution, overestimating the leakage.
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Fig. 4: Enrolment phase of the SCA scheme.
IV. RESULTS FOR HELPER DATA SYSTEMS
We zoom in on the relevant component Xn. We introduce
shorthand notation Z = ψsbcτ (Xn) and V = ψ
bc(Xn). We
write F for the cumulative distribution function of Xn.
A. Leakage from the Quantising HDS
First we look at the sign variable V .
Theorem 1. Let the distribution of Xn be an even function.
Then H(V ) = 1 and
H(V |U)=

J even : 1,
J = 2t+ 1, m even: h( 1−pt2 ),
J = 2t+ 1, m odd : m−1m h(
1−pt
2 ) +
1
m .
(4)
Proof. When J is even, it holds that Pr[V = 1] = 12 for
any u. When J is odd and m is even, it holds for any u that
Pr[V = 1|U = u] = ∑n>t pn = 12∑n 6=t pn = 12 (1 − pt).
When J is odd and m is odd, the above situation holds for
u 6= bm/2c, but for the one special value of u in the middle
we have Pr[V = 1|U = bm2 c] = 12 .
Next we look at the threshold indicator Z. The entropy of Z
is given by H(Z) = h(F (−τ) + 1 − F (τ)). For symmetric
f(x) this reduces to H(Z) = h(2F (−τ)).
Theorem 2 below gives an expression for the entropy of Z
given the helper data, in the regime where the threshold τ
lies in the outermost u-region (the rightmost grayscale band
in Fig. 2), i.e., the medical condition is rare.
Theorem 2. Let f(x) be a symmetric pdf. Let F (−τ) < p0m .
Then
H(Z|U) = 2
m
h (mF (−τ)) . (5)
Proof. For u ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 2} it is certain that Z = 0. This
gives H(Z|U) = 1m
∑m−1
w=0 H(Z|U = u) = 1m [H(Z|U =
0) + H(Z|U = m − 1)]. Due to symmetry this equals
2
mH(Z|U = 0). Since Z is a binary RV we have H(Z|U =
0) = h(Pr[Z = 1|U = 0]). Finally we use Pr[Z = 1|U =
0] = p0 · F (−τ)p0/m .
Remark: For m = 2 we see that H(Z|U) = H(Z), i.e., there
is no leakage.
It is interesting to note that in the HDS with even J and m=2,
the helper data leaks absolutely nothing about V and Z.
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One may wonder if m > 2 is still worth considering. It
should be noted that the noise resilience of the HDS improves
when the number of subdivisions m is increased. Therefore
we cannot exclude that setting m > 2 can be a good design
choice. Theorem 3 below gives a leakage result for the limiting
case m→∞, i.e. the continuum helper data.
Theorem 3. Let f(x) be an even function. Let F (−τ) ≤ p0.
H(Z|U˜) ={
F (−τ) ≤ p02 : 2F (−τ)p0 h(p0)
F (−τ) > p02 : 2p0−2F (−τ)p0 h(p0) +
2F (−τ)−p0
p0
h(2p0).
(6)
Proof. We compute H(Z|U˜) = Eu˜H(Z|U˜ = u˜). Since u˜ is
uniform on [0, 1) this evaluates to
∫ 1
0
du˜ H(Z|U˜ = u˜) =∫ 1
0
du˜ h(Pr[Z = 1|U˜ = u˜]).
Case F (−τ)/p0 ≤ 12 . For p0u˜ ∈ [F (−τ, p0 − F (−τ))] it is
certain that Z = 0. For all other u˜ we have Pr[Z = 1|U˜ =
u˜] = p0.
Case F (−τ)/p0 > 12 . For p0u˜ ∈ [p0 − F (−τ), F (−τ)] we
have Pr[Z = 1|U˜ = u˜] = 2p0 (left tail and right tail). For all
other u˜ the probability is p0.
The relative leakage [H(Z) − H(Z|U˜)]/H(Z) is plotted in
Fig. 5. The dependence on τ looks strange, but three special
points can be understood. (i) For τ →∞ the continuum helper
data completely reveals Z; (ii) For F (−τ) = p0 the helper
data contains no information about |x| crossing the threshold.
That information is contained in S, and the ZLHDS has been
designed not to leak anything about S; (iii) At the intermediate
value F (−τ)/p0 = 1/2 a special symmetry occurs between
the left region S = 0 and the right region S = J − 1. Due to
this symmetry the conditional distribution Z|U˜ = u˜ looks the
same for every value of u˜.
Furthermore the leakage is a decreasing function of J , since
at large J the two tail regions S = 0 and S = J −1 have less
influence.
B. Leakage from the Code Offset Method
Even if the quantising HDS does not reveal V , the helper data
from the Code Offset Method may still do. Typically the sign
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V ∈ {−1, 1} gets turned into a bit value somewhere in the
binary string that serves as input to the COM.
We use notation as in Section II-C. Consider uniform ψ(X) ∈
{0, 1}N , and helper data U = Synψ(X). At fixed u ∈
{0, 1}N−k, there are 2k strings x that are consistent with
u, and all of them have equal probability. The marginal
distribution for one component of ψ(X) is uniform; hence
there is no leakage about V .
The above reasoning no longer applies when ψ(X) is non-
uniform. Then the 2k strings compatible with u are not
uniform. However, the number of strings summed over in
the computation of the marginal is exponentially large; for
most ‘normal-looking’ ψ(X)-distributions the marginal of one
component will still be close to uniform.
Finally we briefly depart from the perfect enrollment setting
and investigate the effect of measurement noise at enrollment
time on the privacy properties of the COM. Suppose there
exists a ‘true’ biometric B ∈ {0, 1}N , which is shielded from
our view by enrollment noise G. The enrollment measurement
yields B⊕G. Then the relevant privacy question is how much
is leaking about (parts of) B, as opposed to B ⊕G.
Proposition 1. Let the enrollment noise G be bitwise iid
Bernoulli noise with bit error rate ε. Let r be the row weight
of the error correcting code. Let U = Syn(B ⊕G). Then
I(B;U) ≈ (N − k)[1− h
(
1
2
− 1
2
(1− 2ε)r
)
]. (7)
Proof. I(B;U) = H(U) −H(U |B) = H(U) −H(SynB ⊕
SynG|B) = H(U) − H(SynG). We use H(U) ≤ N − k.
In a good code the redundancy N − k is just slightly larger
than the entropy of the syndrome SynG. We estimate the
entropy of SynG by setting it close to the Gallager bound
[18], H(SynG) ≈ (N − k)h(α), where α is the bit error
probability of r binary symmetric channels concatenated to-
gether, α = 12 − 12 (1− 2ε)r.
For reasonable values of the row weight, we see that the
leakage I(B;U) is very small, approximately (N−k) (1−2ε)2r2 ln 2 ;
and this is leakage about the whole vector B.
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Fig. 7: Error probabilities for different sparsity ratios αt and
measurement noise σ2Z; setting σ
2
X = 0.5, τ = σX .
V. RESULTS FOR SPARSE CODING WITH AMBIGUATION
A. Method
We consider C users. Each user c ∈ [C] has a measurement
vector x(c); it consists of N components which are modeled
as zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian variables. The enrolment
of the vectors x(1), . . . ,x(C) is as described in Section II-G.
The public data for user c is W(c),u(c).
We consider a verification vector y ∈ RN , which is allegedly
from user c. It is either a noisy version of the enrolled
x(c) or completely unrelated to it (but drawn from the same
distribution). The former case is referred to as Hypothesis H1,
the latter as H0. We write yauth(c) = x(c)+z, with Gaussian
noise z ∼ N (0, σ2ZI). The verification procedure works as
follows. The verifier computes u(c) · ψstcλ (W(c)y). If this
inner product exceeds a threshold, then he decides on H1,
otherwise H0. The expression ψstcλ (W(c)y) is essentially an
STC ‘enrollment’ of y without ambiguation noise. Taking the
inner product with u(c) is meant to remove the ambiguation
noise from u(c) (we call this ‘purification’), and it results in
a similarity score.
The goal of the SCA mechanism is to prevent recovery of x
and the corresponding ψ(xn) from the enrolment data while
enabling a verifier to check if y is consistent with enrolment
data u(c). We can characterize the performance of SCA in
terms of:
(i) preservation of mutual information between X and X̂ in
the authorized case, i.e. I(X; X̂|H1) → H(X), whilst in the
unauthorized case I(X; X̂|H0) → 0. The same holds for a
function of X, i.e., I(ψ(Xn);ψ(X̂n)|H1) → H(ψ(Xn)) and
I
(
ψ(Xn);ψ(X̂n)|H0
)→ 0.
(ii) Reconstruction error: We investigate the error probabilities
PHe (c) = Pr[ψ
sbc
τ (X̂n(c)) 6= ψsbcτ (Xn(c))|H]. (8)
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Fig. 8: Normalized Information Leakage I(WU ;Z)H(Z) as a func-
tion of ambiguation ratio SnL−St . λ = τ = σX . (a) W = I; (b)
W equals the PCA transform of the matrix [x(1) · · ·x(C)].
Let p , Pr[ψsbcτ (Xn) = 1], p < 12 . Ideally it should hold that
PH1e → 0 and PH0e → 2p(1− p). The latter expression is for
random X̂n independent of Xn, with the same distribution.
B. Performance results
We consider a database X of C = 100, 000 random vec-
tors (individuals) with dimensionality N = 256, which are
generated from the distribution N (0, σ2XI). We then generate
the noisy version of X with two different noise variances
σ2Z = 0.4σ
2
X and σ
2
Z = 0.8σ
2
X . We consider square matrix
W, i.e., L = N .
We look at the error probability averaged over the users and
the components, P
H
e =
1
CN
∑N
n=1
∑C
c=1 P
H
e (c).
Fig. 7 shows the averaged error probability P
H
e as a function of
the ambiguation ratio SnL−St , for fixed σ
2
X = 0.5, τ = σX and
different sparsity ratios αt , St/L = 0.025, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 and
measurement noise variances σ2Z = 0.4σ
2
X , 0.8σ
2
X . Several
things are worth noting.
• For the un-enrolled case (random y), the error probability
in guessing the privacy bit Z increases as a function of
the ambiguation ratio. This is as expected.
• In the genuine user case the situation is more complex;
the ambiguation noise interferes with the measurement
noise.
• There is a clear gap between the genuine user case
and the un-enrolled case. The low1 (and in some plots
nearly constant) error rate for genuine users demonstrates
that the ‘purification’ correctly removes the ambiguation
noise.
Furthermore we compute the leakage I(W,U;Z)/H(Z).
Fig. 8a shows what happens when W is set to the trivial
value W = I. The leakage decreases from 100% to zero with
increasing ambiguation. The curve seems to consist of three
ambiguation ratio regimes, with piecewise linear behaviour:
0 − 0.25, 0.25 − 05 and 0.5 − 1. At the moment we are not
able to explain this behaviour.
Fig. 8b shows what happens when a less trivial matrix W
is used, namely the PCA transform matrix of the matrix
1 Note that the False Negative probability for the overall user matching is
much lower than the single-component reconstruction error.
[x(1) · · ·x(C)]. This same W is used for all users. We
again observe piecewise linear behaviour with the same three
intervals. However, the middle piece is no longer constant but
increasing. More importantly, the leakage is reduced by orders
of magnitude. Fig. 8b also shows the leakage from Sparse
Binary Coding with ambiguation; it is slightly smaller than
for the ternary case.
C. Non-square projection matrix
We briefly discuss the case L > N , i.e. the number of random
projections is larger than the dimension of x. The adversary is
confronted with an ambiguized ternary vector u, and from it
has to guess the v = ψstcλ (Wx) by guessing which locations
in u contain the ambiguation noise. When L is larger than
N , the adversary may be able to distinguish between wrong
guesses and the correct guess, as follows. For a wrong guess it
will typically hold that WW †vwrong is far away from vwrong,
while on the other hand it holds that WW †v ≈ v. From the
correct v an estimator for x is then obtained as x̂ = W †v.
Hence, information-theoretically speaking, there is no privacy
protection. However, the amount of effort in going through all
the possible guesses scales as
(
St+Sn
Sn
)
, which is huge. The
security is computational, not information-theoretic.
VI. DISCUSSION
For quantizing HDSs we have established that there is a clearly
identifiable optimal choice for protecting the V and Z bits:
taking the number of quantization intervals to be even, and
setting m = 2. However, for noise tolerance it is advantageous
to set m as large as possible. The Z-leakage result for m→∞
(Fig. 5) has some caveats. It is nice that a minimum exists
at F (−τ) = p0/2 and F (−τ) = p0, but unfortunately the
operational meaning of τ is not really well defined. A small
shift of τ has little impact on the concept “this variable is
abnormally far from zero”, but has a large effect in Fig. 5. It
is left as a topic for future work to study this further.
There are no such subtleties for the Code Offset Method. We
think we can safely conclude that the COM has only negligible
leakage.
For the SCA approach we have established that there is a clear
gap between how much you know about Z if you do and
do not have access to a matching verification measurement
y(c). (Not having such access means trying to reconstruct
Z from the public data.) This is visible as a gap (Fig. 7) in
the error probability for reconstructing Z, and as low mutual
information I(W,U;Z) in Fig. 8b. Determining the leakage
about sign(Xn) is left for future work. Other topics for future
work are further experimentation with different choices of the
projection matrix W and understanding the piecewise linear
shape of the leakage curve.
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